ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
2 NOV 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Via: Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA)
SUBJECTS: U.S. Military Race Relations in Europe: September 1970
The joint Department of Defense-Military Services visit to European installations, September 12-October 7, 1970, must be termed a partially successful. Complete success can be claimed when there is an obvious alleviation and elimination of many of the documented problems as a result of policy formulation and direction from DoD through the Services. A dramatic turnaround of behavior and attitudes in the area of race and human relations is imperative in the military services if we are to maintain highly effective combat and support-oriented units that are prepared for their primary mission.
There is no attempt herewith to belabor philosophic variances on how much or to what degree there should or should not be a functionally and fraternally integrated military. We have cut this message from the core with the hope the use of direct comment and unflewered prose will further emphasize the sharpness of our focus on the issue. One thing should be clear from the outset. The problems are not unlike the media have made them appear. We must insure that our declaration of Human Goals is a way of life.
This report reflects some of the general concerns and suggestions that the team projects as a result of the 3-1/2 week intensive look at several of our bases. We looked at the problems involving race relations and human relations. This trip was just one of a seriesthat teams composed somewhat like this have made 'to the European theater before as well as to Southeast Asia and the continental United States.
At this point in time the problems that we do find among our service personnel related to human rights, equal opportunity, and race
relations are critical and must be addressed with unusual expediency. We recognize the fact that our personnel, to a great degree, reflect the attitudes and mores of our civilian society. However, with the type of control and the structure of the military establishment, we should again take the lead in providing for the cost of our country the methodology and performance in this area which will result in the obliteration of the problems which are documented on the following pages.
Frank W. Render II
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Equal Opportunity)
Table of Contents
PURPOSE OF VISIT
The joint DoD-Military Services team visited a number of European military installations in order to make an assessment of the effectiveness of the present policies and programs of the Department of Defense and the Military Departments related to equal opportunity and race relations. This visit was to result in recommendations being made to the Secretary of Defense as to programs and/or policies to be eliminated, instituted, modified, expanded, or changed in some way. Although trips of this nature had been made at other times, it was most important that such a trip was undertaken when it was as a result of our knowledge of civil unrest and turmoil among military personnel in the European theater.
The team also had a responsibility to provide guidance to local commanders and to conduct discussions and open channels of communication with personnel at the various installations.
Locations Visited
Air Forces
RAF Lakenheath, England
Ramstein AB, Germany
Navy
U.S. Naval Station, Rota, Spain
Confirmed Naples, Italy
Army
USAREUR Headquarters, Heidelberg, Germany
Mannheim Area, Germany
Karlsruhe Area, Germany
Berlin Brigade, Germany
Nuernberg Area, Germany
USEUCOM Headquarters, Stuttgart, Germany
ROSTER OF TEAM MEMBERS
From the United States
From the European Theater
GENERAL ON-BASE ITINERARY
A. First Day
B. Second Day
2. 1045-1215: Team to meet with groups of approximately 50 officers.
3. 1230-1330: Lunch with troops in enlisted mess hall.
4. 1345-1515: Open invitation period in room to hold approximately fifty troops. Maximum possible dissemination to be given to time and place of session stressing availability of DASD (CR) to talk with interested troops of any race, creed, color.
5. 1530-1700: Second session of open invitation period.
6. 1715-1845: Third session of open invitation period.
7. Evening: Same as A. 7. above.
C. Third Day
1. 0830-1030: Team conference to prepare exit briefing.
2. 1045-1200: Concurrent exit briefings. Team chief to Commander and his immediate staff while team members brief working level staff personnel.
3. 1215: Lunch and subsequent departure.
More than 5600 military personnel and dependents were involved in personal communication activity in the forms of seminars, open discussion-groups, and personal conversation during the visitation. Listed below are the places visited and the numbers seen (included are all levels jointly).
* Special unscheduled visitation not included in total.
RATIONALE FOR DEALING PRINCIPALLY WITH BLACK-WHITE PROBLEMS
At this point in time as we reflect on the overt manifestations of feelings about treatment of people and without the considerations of race, it becomes apparent that the core of the problems and the greatest amount of difficulty relates to the negative interface between black and white personnel. Consequently most of our attention, has been focused on the black minority as representative of minority problems. Not to be disregarded are the problems incurred by the Services in dealing with Spanish-surnamed have an obvious language difficulty.
ALIENATION AND REBELLION: A NEW HIGH LEVEL OF BLACK FRUSTRATION AND ANGER
In our pre-trip planning we fairly accurately enumerated the problem areas on the basis of prior experience and more recent communications from the field: promotions, discrimination in administration of military justice, lack of significant awareness concerning the black revolution and the thrust for identity, complaints concerning work assignments and details, impairment in the system of communications, the display of offensive symbols, flags and emblems.
The new discovery was one of degree and intensity. We found a higher level of frustration and anger among blacks than was anticipated. We were aware of their general concerns and were aware of the racial unrest, tensions and conflict. We did not anticipate finding such acute frustration and such volatile anger as we found among the blacks, nor did we expect to find a somewhat lower level of frustration clearly evidenced by young whites. In many meetings we could detect that there were those present who came for the purpose of disrupting the meeting and casting incredulity on the visit. Attempts were made in several instances to protest with verbally inflammatory language rank with profanity and obscenities. It was necessary to restrain several men from such verbal abuse and require them to talk in more civil tones. The exercise of firm control of the discussions and the manner in which they were conducted overcame these uncivil manifestations of frustration and anger.
At Mannheim and Karlsruhe we found small cores of alienated blacks who could not be reached. They angrily told us that they had no reason
to be fighting in a white man's Army and in a white man's war; that their place was back in the States: New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Detroit; Jacksonville, where they could fight to liberate and free their black sisters and brothers from the dirty, stinking, teeming ghettos and from all forms of racial bigotry and oppression. They told us they wanted guns, ammunition and grenades because they felt “whitey” understood no approach other than that of violent confrontation. They accused us of coining over to brainwash them, and at least on two occasions they asked the facetious question: “How much money are you being paid to come over here to brainwash us?”
We attempted and succeeded in talking with these individuals in small or private groups after the general sessions, and in most instances we could persuade them of the folly of their view, but there were some individuals that were beyond the influence of reason and discussions. They had given up on the establishment and the system -- the establishment of the Armed Forces and the system that represents the American way of life. Neither, they felt, was capable of correcting its own errors or remedying its own shortcomings.
There is no problem or situation at the present time in the Armed Forces which requires any more resourcefulness of a commander and his leadership capabilities than that of race relations.
EDUCATIONAL SEMINARS IN RACE RELATIONS
At each of the installations that was visited a seminar-forum type discussion was held with commissioned officers, NCOs, and a combination and mixture of officers, NCOs and younger enlisted men of all racial and ethnic groups. To stimulate and provoke discussion, each of the groups was shown a 35-minute movie, “Black and White Uptight.” The discussions and dialogues were uniformly lively throughout the trip. It was difficult in some places to initiate the discussion, but once the dialogue started the men entered into it with zest and constructive, criticism.
PRINCIPAL CONCERNS
1. The Failure of Command Leadership
Perhaps the most overriding single factor about which there can be generalizations regarding the visible shortcomings of the Military Services in dealing with the present human relations-race relations problem is the failure in too many instances of command leadership to exercise its authority and responsibility in these areas. There certainly have been enough documents written and statements circulated that give commanders on all levels the authority and responsibility to provide for equal treatment and equal opportunity as these two methods of behavior relate to all personnel in a command. There is hereby recognized the failure of some men on various levels to provide for and monitor the equal opportunity provisions which are already part of our regulations and procedures. Hence, incidents which have racial overtones have proliferated over the last several months in the European theater, mostly in Germany. Upon some detailed, as well as cursory examination, it can be determined that these incidents were not spontaneous, although some overt act or some minor physical or verbal confrontation might have set off the incident.
In practically every case where an incident has been documented, a history of long unresolved differences, misunderstandings, improper and inadequate communication have surfaced as prime aggravating factors which give rise to so much of the negative, anti-social behavior. Too often the incidents occur not only to the dismay of commanders, but to the surprise of commanders, who wonder how such a thing could have happened in an element of their commands.
It also comes to light in instances of this nature that the communication along the chain of command too often has been thwarted, subverted, or halted by “middle-managers.”
2. Activists? Militants?
Too often white leadership personnel refer to any black who asserts himself in any way as a militant. It must be understood that a person who is not docile and unobtrusive is not necessarily “militant.” Most young blacks and many young whites today are activists who are very concerned about the system and want to do what they can through some activity of their own in conjunction with the already identified leaders. These people are activists.
On the other hand, you have people who might be determined militant, some of whom want to work within the system, and some who are .trying to destroy the system from within or without. Command must be sensitized to making a distinction and utilizing the talents of the activists-type, while separating to some extent the militant who could do severe damage to the other troops who are trying to progress in a reasonable manner. To wit: During the European tour, a communication from a commander at one base to a commander at another area to which we-were to go contained this observation: “Mr. Render is a top grade militant. If he were not in the Army he would be a leader in the Black Panthers.” No better example could be given to illustrate how misunderstood both the terminology as well as the mission of the Black Panthers certainly is.
3. The Administration of Military Justice
Although many blacks felt that they were being discriminated against as commanders would apply justice, whites felt that in many ways there wire significant inconsistencies in the way military justice was handled. Statistics show an overwhelming number of blacks being processed through the system of military justice through the use of Article 15 as well as through special and general courts-martial. There were complaints about the dispersing and harshness of fines and sentences imposed on minorities. There was also the implication of excessive pre-trial confinement for minorities; and there seemed to be inadequate and insufficient counseling about and knowledge of rights and procedures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Also there appeared to be a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of rules and regulations.
4. Serious Inconsistencies in the Communications System
In the vertical transmission of information among the chain of command there were glaring inconsistencies of middle management's carrying out its responsibilities. Middle managers (junior NCOs and junior officers) seemed not to communicate adequately. In the failure of complaints, concerns, and guidance up and down the chain getting the attention they should, not only was there evidence of junior officers being offenders, but majors and lieutenant colonels as well seemed too often not willing to admit their inability to solve some of the most perplexing problems in the areas of human relations and race relations. It is felt that many fear an admission of this type, not recognizing that there are few experts in the field, and admission of lack of ability to fully understand and/or handle these problems would not reflect adversely on their efficiency and effectiveness.
ENUMERATION OF PROBLEMS AND COMPLAINTS WITH COMMENTS
1. Feeling that there was Racial Discrimination in Promotions
Statistics indicate that there are some obvious discrepancies in numbers and percentages of blacks and their distribution at various levels even when comparing individuals with similar records and equal time in service.
2. Unfair Treatment in Work Assignments and Detail
This seemed to be a problem that was more peculiar to the Army, but affected blacks who project this as discriminatory, as well as whites. Both felt that it was demeaning and contributed to failure to
advance rapidly because of the lack of familiarity with assignments which resulted in subpar ratings.
3. Military Police
All of the Services should do a better job of training their military police in the method of handling people. We are aware of many situations involving the police in our civilian communities that have some racial overtones. Enlightened emphasis on special training to effect reasonable results has proven beneficial and successful. Absence of a significant number of blacks in the military police was noted at some installations.
4. Clubs on Post
In some of the enlisted men’s clubs which were visited, physical polarization was quite evident, with blacks and whites congregating in various sections of the club facility. This is not a causal factor of strained relations, but a reaction to some of the basic causes which are documented elsewhere in this report. If the people (enlisted men) who frequent these clubs could have some voice in the club's operation, more meaningful activity and pleasant experiences could take place, with the prospect of them being centers for future dialogue and camaraderie.
5. Deficiency in Understanding Insights and Interpretation of the Contemporary Modes, Movements and Behavior Patterns
a. There is an obvious inability and unwillingness of many in leadership positions to accept differences in culture and life
styles. This affects not only minority groups but many of the other younger troops as well. There are particularly three elements of separation in the present military system that compound the problem.
(1) Rank -- In order to have properly functioning military aggregation, vie must have the difference and responsibilities determined by rank.
(2) Generational outlook -- Young people today do not view the world as many older people view it and are very vocal and active in expressing their own points of view. Many older military personnel tend not to respect the personality and thinking capacity of young people which consequently leads to conflict.
(3) Race -- because of the well documented racial history of this country, the subsequent movement toward equality through legal processes and the slowness with which we have “granted” minorities “rights,” along with the subsequent thrust of minorities for full recognition and the determination of many whites to hold the line, we have racial conflict which is reflected throughout the services.
b. Fear of the rise of black awareness and the thrust for black identity with its changes in hairstyles, dress, music, signs, and symbols.
6. Universal cry of Blacks and Other Minority Personnel to be Treated with Respect, Dignity and Equality
There was an obvious absence of any feeling for preferential or special treatment. Only just to be treated equally was what the minorities told us.
7. The Great Need for Positive Action to End Discrimination in Off-Post Housing and Other Public Facilities such as Bars and Taverns, Hotels and Inns
Housing on the foreign economy was an especial area of -concern-in Germany where racial discrimination and price discrimination reached overwhelming proportions. This created some ill feeling by those who
suffered this kind of treatment because of the feeling that the military condoned this behavior by a seeming lack of action to eliminate it or at least have military personnel a party to this practice by securing goods and services from host country citizens who carry on in this manner.
8. Racial Polarization, both Coerced and Voluntary, Physical and Psychological
Coerced polarization comes about when blacks put down other blacks who associate with whites and whites reject other whites who associate with blacks. This and the way by which many blacks tend to gather together in groups (no more so than whites.) is manifestation of the “covered wagon complex” where in order to psychologically and
physically protect themselves blacks have formed informal groups and tend to socialize among themselves. After a long history of experience of being intentionally rejected by whites purely on the basis of race, it is understandable why this type of anti-social behavior takes place. Blacks' in groups of 3 or 4 or more are viewed as a threat and thought to be prone to disruption or riotous activity and in many cases these groups without provocation are dispersed, whereas groups of whites who gather together are considered to be merely carrying on social conversation. Voluntary polarization is reactive behavior that results from several causal factors as indicated in this document.
9. Exportation to Europe of American Racism which affects the Local Populace
There are cases of white military personnel imposing economic sanction and threats on local businessmen and as well on girls by stating that if they allow blacks to frequent their establishments or associate with them the whites who comprise the vast majority of personnel would discontinue association or trading at the establishment. Many Nationals decided to do just as requested for
10. Policies and Directives in the Chain of Command lack Uniformity and Implementation due to Officers and NCOs who make Decisions and Interpretations by Assuming they have the Right to Make Variation
11. Lack of Black Officers and NCOs
There is a critical need for experienced black officers to command and interface with troops. In many instances the percentage of black officers in a command was consistent with the total service percentage,
but these men were found behind desks aid were not dealing with the troops on a daily basis. This is important to do during this period of time for the proper image projection for the young black troops. It was also felt there was tokenism in the appointment of black flag and general officers.
12. Lack of Confidence in the Chain of Command and Its Ability to be Responsive to the Needs of Young Troops (White as well as Black)
The Inspectors General and Chaplains generally did not seem to have the type of influence in terms of what they should be capable of doing.
13. Lack of Visible Minorities in Related Support Activities
a. Base Services, i. e., Exchange --
There seemed to be too few minority working in base services support activities, especially in visible roles.
b. Dependent Schools --
There is a lack of minority teachers in-overseas dependents' schools, despite many efforts by personnel in DoD and in- service dependent school teachers to recruit blacks and other minorities.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS -- UNITED STATES ARMY
The community leader concept in Germany was: a significant factor in providing the proper type of communication and command authority which has to be quite strong and evident in order to successfully combat the problems which involve race and human relations. Many community leaders because of the nature of the authority which is (or isn't) invested in them, fail to exercise the leadership in this area that would be beneficial to correcting many of the problems related to poor communication, insensitivity and lack of awareness. The problems are intensified in support areas as they differentiate in mission and scope from combat areas.
GENERAL COMMENT
All commands were dutiful in receiving us and assumed a posture of respect for our office if not our mission. Most commands did exhibit to varying degrees an apprehensive, less than positive attitude relative to the business which we went to carry out. There was a general reluctance of many people in leadership positions to air human relations-race relations problems. There was fear that our coming and communicating with enlisted -personnel would give rise to problems “that never existed before” or bring to the surface situations that had been ignored for some time: The failure to recognize and deal with “the problem” has caused some individuals and loosely-knit groups to go “underground.” When there is communication, the generation of positive programs, and people are talking, the basis for an 'underground' weakens and the prospects for radicalizing lessen.
AFFIRMATIVE FINDINGS
1. The desire of young black and white enlisted personnel to dialogue and communicate with each other in order to promote understanding and eliminate tensions was evident and expressed in many areas we visited.
2. Wherein Human Relations Councils or comparable organizations have been established there were generally more healthy attitudes and an atmosphere that was conducive to open communication. The knowledge that command leadership has a sincere interest in fostering good human relations to the point of providing not only theoretical direction, but time and a program seems to have an uplifting effect on personnel.
3. A significant number of whites verbally reinforced the concerns by blacks in their quest for equality.
4. General and flag officers in practically every area were strong, sensitized individuals who had affirmative attitudes in this area. It was unfortunate that strictures in the channel of communication have not in many cases permitted their feelings to be fully communicated to all levels.
SUGGESTIONS
1. Human relations machinery built into the military:
a. An equal opportunity and/or human relations officer with direct access to commanding officers should be established at every major unit. Depending upon the size of smaller units, an individual should be given the EO responsibility, and not have his work complicated with a multitude of other duties. This officer in any case must be well trained. Although equal opportunity, as other programs, is the ultimate responsibility of the commander, the Equal. Opportunity Officer would be able to assist the commander in a sophisticated way to insure a more comprehensive program in this area.
b. Human Relations Councils should be established at practically every military unit so that there will be an opportunity for some type of structure wherein informal as well as more formalized dialogue and communication can take place relative to race and human relations.
2. Mechanisms should be designed by each Service to insure the efficient and effective operation of the communication system through the already established chain of command.
3. Provisions made for officers and NCOs who are bigoted and irresponsive relative to equal opportunity to be relieved.
4. Joint OSD-Military Department teams similar to this one which went to Europe should circulate more often (at least annually) in all three major geographical areas of operation -- CONUS, Southeast Asia, Europe.
5. There must be instituted as soon as possible a full scale program in education and race relations so that military personnel at all levels can become more knowledgeable in how to deal with the problems of human and race relations both on a personal and intrapersonal basis. (A separate memorandum with more details follows.) This type of program is essential for any long-range development that will reflect an affirmative position in this very critical and sensitive area.
6. With input from the very highest command in each Service, OSD must see to it that programs of equal opportunity and race and human relations are not just paid 'lip' service or relegated to documents, but are in reality affecting, in the best possible ways, all of the personnel in the Military Services.
